Mental Health - Validity of Commitment Statute by Brunetti, Frank Leo
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 10 Number 4 Article 9 
1972 
Mental Health - Validity of Commitment Statute 
Frank Leo Brunetti 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Frank L. Brunetti, Mental Health - Validity of Commitment Statute, 10 Duq. L. Rev. 674 (1972). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol10/iss4/9 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
Case Comment
MENTAL HEALTH-VALIDITY OF COMMITMENT STATTE-The United
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania has held
Pennsylvania's two doctor commitment procedure for the mentally ill
to be unconstitutional.
Dixon v. Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
Plaintiff was convicted of criminal charges and committed to Fairview
State Hospital for the criminally insane. After the original authority
for his commitment had elapsed he was recommitted pursuant to sec-
tion 4404 of the Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966
(hereafter referred to as Act).' Pursuant to rule 23a of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure,2 plaintiff filed a class action suit alleging
section 4404 of the Act to be unconstitutional on its face and in its
application to plaintiff and members of his class. The substantial con-
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4404 (1969). Commitment on application by relative, etc.;
physician's certificates; review
(a) A written application for commitment to a facility may be made in the interest
of any person who appears to be mentally disabled and in need of care. It may be
made by a relative, guardian, friend, individual standing in loco parentis to the person
to be committed, or by the executive officer or an authorized agent of a governmental
or recognized nonprofit health or welfare organization or agency, or any responsible
person.
(b) Such application shall be accompanied by the certificate of two physicians who
have examined the person whose commitment is sought, within one week of the date
of the certificates, and who have found that, in their opinion, such person is men-
tally disabled and in need of care. In the case of a mentally retarded person, the
physicians certification shall be accompanied by the report of a psychologist. No
person shall be committed hereunder if any certificate is dated more than thirty days
prior to the date of commitment, except that if the mental disability consists of
mental retardation the certificates may be dated no more than three months prior to
the date of commitment. The application, certificate and report, if any, shall be
signed and sworn to or affirmed.
(c) The director may receive the person named in the application and detain him
until discharge in accordance with the provisions of this act. When application is
made by any person other than a relative or guardian, the director upon reception
of the person named in the application shall notify the appropriate relative or
guardian of such person of the commitment.
(d) Every commitment made under this section except those to the Veterans Ad-
ministration or other agency of the United States government, shall be reviewed at
least annually by a committee appointed by the director from the professional staff
of the facility wherein the person is detained, to determine whether continued care
and commitment is necessary. Said committee shall make recommendations to the
director which shall be filed at the facility, and be open to inspection and review
by the department, and such other persons as the secretary, by regulation, may permit.
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
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stitutional issue required the convening of a three judge district court
as ordered by the chief judge of the circuit.3
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Penn-
sylvania declared section 4404 of the Act to be unconstitutional on its
face and as applied to plaintiff and members of his class. 4 While de-
claring section 4404 of the Act unconstitutional, the opinion was silent
on why. The court said only that section 4404 was devoid of the due
process of law required by the fourteenth amendment. 5 The statute
provided for recommitment by way of a "paper notation" without
any formal hearing or process.6 It also denied to the patients-the
right to counsel, the right to trial by jury, the right to confrontation
and cross-examination, and other criminal judicial safeguards. One rea-
son the Dixon court declared section 4404 of the Act unconstitutional
might be that mental patients can no longer be considered wards of
the state.7 It is submitted that the doctrine of parens patriae8 is no
longer viable.
This court, following the lead of others around the country,9 has
come to realize that justice will not be done by saying a mental patient
is a ward of the state, and the state is only acting in his beneficial
interest. The court realized that the commitment determination is no
different from any other legal determination. The special procedure
which had been followed in determining the issue of insanity was
not beneficial to the patient. When a person is to be committed against
his will, he should be given a full judiciary hearing.
The court, in its order, outlined a procedure by which all members
of the plaintiff's class were to be recommitted or discharged, and how
future involuntary commitments were to be obtained.10 The court
specifically dealt with the plaintiff and members of his class, but was
silent on how other patients who had been committed under section
4404 of the Act were affected by the decision. They did not say whether
3. This was done pursuant to 28 US.C. § 2284(1) (1970).
4. 325 F. Supp. 966, 973 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
5. Id. at 972.
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50 § 4404 (1969).
7. Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968), where the court declared un-
constitutional a statute which provided for commitment of a person found not guilty of
criminal charges due to temporary insanity. This commitment, as in Dixon, was without
criminal procedural safeguards.
8. BLACK'S LAW DiCrIONARY 1269 (3d ed. 1970) defines parens patriae in the United
States, as a sovereign-refering to the sovereign power of guardianship over a person
under disability, such as minors, and insane and incompetent persons.
9. See, e.g., Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
10. 325 F. Supp. 966, 974-75 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
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their decision should have been retroactively applied to invalidate all
commitments which had been obtained under section 4404 of the Act
since the statute's enactment. Normally a decision is considered to be
retroactive unless stated otherwise. 11
The Attorney General consented to the order, declining to appeal
the decision. The Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, Office
of Mental Health, complied with the decision and stated that as of
June 15, 1971, no further commitments were to be obtained under
section 4404 of the Act. In addition, all jurisdictions were advised by
the Attorney General that all patients currently hospitalized under
section 4404, and all other commitments under similar provisions of
law in effect before the enactment of the 1966 Act, were to be re-
evaluated and either discharged where appropriate, or recommended
for commitment under an appropriate section of the Act.' 2
Approximately 75% of the state schools and hospitals' population
were committed under section 4404, or under similar provisions of
law.13 The results of the patients requiring conversion were these:
1. Approximately 1.5% were discharged.
2. Approximately 88% were converted to section 4402 commit-
ments.'
4
3. Approximately 8% were placed under section 4403.15
4. Approximately 2.5% were committed, or are being processed
by civil court commitment. 6
The question raised by these statistics is whether there should have
been a recommitment of all patients who were committed under section
4404 of the Act and similar provisions of law in effect prior to 1966.
Should 4404 patients have been recommitted under section 4402 of the
Act, or should the decision have been applied prospectively to uphold
all prior commitments?
11. City of Philadelphia v. Schaller, 148 Pa. Super. 276, 280, 25 A.2d 406, 409 (1942).
12. Letter from Ralph J. Phelleps, Special Assistant for Service to Offenders, Office of
Mental Health, Department of Public Welfare, December 15, 1971.
13. Id.
14. Id.; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4402 (1969), provides for voluntary commitment by
written application of anyone over eighteen years old. If the person is under age eighteen,
an application can be made by his parents or someone acting in place of his parents.
The patient is free to leave the institution at any time.
15. Letter, supra note 12; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4403 (1969), provides for voluntary
commitment in a procedure very similar to § 4402, except that the duration of the com-
mitment can not exceed thirty days.
16. Letter, supra note 12; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4406 (1969), provides for involuntary
civil court commitment pursuant to a hearing. The court order commanding commit-
ment will not be given until the person has been given a full physical examination.
676
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RETROACTIVITY
In at least one other jurisdiction where the court was faced with this
situation they decided, in the interest of justice, to apply their decision
pro spectively. In Bolton v. Harris17 the court found unconstitutional
a statute which committed a person acquitted of criminal charges be-
cause of temporary insanity without a judicial determination.
Relying on a patient's right to bring a writ of habeas corpus to de-
cide anew the sanity issue, the court declared its decision was to be
applied prospectively. Rather than upsetting all commitments made
pursuant to the now unconstitutional statute, the Bolton court felt that
the, prior commitments should remain valid-unless a patient wished
to contest his confinement through the writ of habeas corpus. The court
reviewed the burden on the administration of justice; it felt that in the
interest of justice its decision should be applied prospectively. Un-
fortunately, the court did not review the criteria necessary to apply
a decision prospectively and one can only speculate why it did so.
The traditional view in Pennsylvania is that a decision will be given
retroactive effect, and its "pronouncements will be considered as the
law from the beginning."' 8 Nevertheless, the United States Supreme
Court in Linkletter v. Walker 9 said "the Constitution neither requires
nor
'
prohibits retrospective effect." 20 Thus it is within the discretion of
the court to apply a decision retroactively, or prospectively. Since
Linkletter was a criminal case, and the instant case a civil one, one
might argue that Linkletter is not controlling. However, "no distinc-
tion is drawn between civil and criminal cases" 2 ' in the retroactive or
prospective application of a decision. Even if one would draw a distinc-
tion, the Dixon court said, "commitment procedure should be the same
in civil proceedings as in criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings .... 22
17. 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
18. City of Philadelphia v. Schaller, 148 Pa. Super. 276, 280, 25 A.2d 406, 409 (1942),
citing People ex rel. Rice v. Graves, 249 App. Div. 128, 273 N.Y.S. 582 (1934); accord,
Buradus v. General Cement Products Co., 356 Pa. 349, 52 A.2d 205 (1947); Menge v.
Philadelphia, 36 Pa. D. & C. 352 (C.P. Philadelphia 1939).
19. 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965); accord, Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil and Refining
Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932).
20. 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965).
21. Id. at 629.
22. Dixon citing Denton v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 383 S.W. 2d 681 (Ky. 1964);
contra, Tate v. Shovlin, 205 Pa. Super. 370, 208 A.2d 924 (1965), where the court said
the commitment proceedings were not criminal in nature; rather they were "collateral".
This "collateral" proceeding was one in which the mental condition of the person in-
volved was determined without a full judicial hearing. Full procedural safeguards were
not given since the proceeding was for the benefit of the person, the public, or both.;
see also Comment, Equal Protection and Commitment of the Insane in Wisconsin, 50
MARQ. L. REv. 120 (1967).
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The criteria used in deciding if a decision should be prospectively
applied was outlined in Linkletter, Stovall v. Denno,23 Johnson v. New
Jersey,2 4 and Desist v. United States.25 In Johnson the Court said, "cases
establish the principle that in criminal litigation concerning constitu-
tional claims the court in the interest of justice will make the rule
prospective . . . where the exigencies of the situation require such an
application .... ,26
The criteria which Desist outlined to guide the resolution of the
question are (1) the burden on the administration of justice by the
retroactive effect of the new standard, (2) the good faith reliance on
the old standard, and (3) the purpose to be served by the new stan-
dard . 2 7 By evaluating these factors the Dixon court could have decided
if the decision was to be applied prospectively. If the burden on the
administration of justice was too great, and the reliance on the old
standard was too severe, and if the purpose to be served would not
have been realized, the new standard could have been applied pro-
spectively.28 But:
Where the major purpose of new constitutional doctrine is to
overcome an aspect of the criminal trial which substantially im-
pairs its truth-finding function and so raises serious questions about
the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials, the new rule has been
given retroactive effect. Neither good faith reliance by state or Fed-
eral authorities on prior constitutional law or accepted practice,
nor severe impact on the administration of justice has sufficed to re-
quire prospective application in these circumstances. (Emphasis
added) .29
If the old commitment procedure substantially impaired the truth
finding function it should have been applied retroactively.30
The issue in Dixon was which standard was applicable to the 4404
commitment procedure declared unconstitutional by the court. Did
23. 388 U.S. 293 (1967); see also Fairchild, Limitations of New Judge-Made Law to
Prospective Effect only: "Prospective Overruling" or "Sunbursting," 51 MARQ. L. REv.
254 (1968).
24. 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
25. 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
26. 384 U.S. 719, 726-27 (1966).
27. 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
28. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
29. Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646 (1971), involving two petitioners, one seek-
ing direct review of his criminal conviction, the other collaterally attacking his con-
viction through a writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court in a lengthy opinion said
the three criteria for retroactive application were not met, and that Chimel v. California,
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the Dixon court say the old standard was completely unfair and that
it failed to accurately decide whether a person warrants commitment;
or, did the court think that, for the most part, commitment was ac-
curate as to the issue of sanity?
It is true the former procedure lacked all the judicial safeguards
which are offered in criminal trials. Nevertheless, up to the time of
the Dixon decision a commitment proceeding was not considered to be
a criminal proceeding but rather a collateral one-one in which the
court determined the mental condition of the person involved. The
commitment proceeding followed the doctrine of parens patriae,3 l and
was not considered to be adversarial as in a criminal trial. Rather the
state, acting in a benign way, would decide in an informal proceeding
if someone was "in need of care."3 2
In view of this background, one should not compare the old pro-
cedure to a criminal standard to decide whether it was fundamentally
unfair. Rather, it should be compared to a civil procedure of its kind.
In comparing the two procedures, one should not say the old procedure
was fundamentally unfair; rather it was merely another way of arriving
at the determination of insanity. The new procedure, outlined in
Dixon, is more aligned with today's idea that involuntary commitment
to a mental institution is in the nature of a criminal proceeding.
33
Comparing this case with In re Gault,8 4 it can be seen that the transi-
tion from an informal quasi-criminal to a formal criminal hearing is
identical. Gault dealt with a fifteen-year-old boy who was taken into
custody because he made lewd telephone calls. After a hearing in a
juvenile court, Gault was committed to a state industrial school with-
out: notice of the charges; the right to counsel; the right to confronta-
tion and cross-examination; the privilege against self-incrimination; the
right to a transcript of the proceedings; and the right to appellate re-
view.3 5
Prior to Gault, juvenile delinquency proceedings were generally con-
sidered not to be in the nature of a criminal proceeding. The state
argued, on appeal, that due process protections did not apply, for the
proceedings were intended to help and rehabilitate the youthful of-
fender and not to punish him. The state was acting in parens patriae.
31. Tate v. Shovlin, 205 Pa. Super. 370, 374, 208 A.2d 924, 926 (1965).
32. Id.
33. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 114-15 (1965).
34. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
35. Id. at 10.
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This argument was flatly rejected, and the court held that procedural
safeguards would have to be given to the youthful offender during the
juvenile hearing.3 6 After Gault was decided, Cradle v. Peyton3 7 con,
sidered whther Gault's standards should be retroactively applied.
Cradle, age 17, was brought before a juvenile court on two charges of
armed robbery. He was not represented by counsel, nor was one pro-
vided. The Cradle court said, "we believe that in the absence of coun-
sel, proceedings have been scrupulously fair and without prejudice :to
the accused. '38 The court then concluded that the decision should be
applied prospectively. On appeal to the Supreme Court, certiorari was
denied . 3 9
Both Gault and Dixon implement the procedural safeguards of the
criminal proceedings. Now that the Dixon court has decided to treat
commitment to a mental institution as a criminal proceeding it is 'be-
lieved the new standard should have been prospectively applied.
The Burden and the Reliance
If the Dixon decision would have been applied retroactively,. that
is if everyone who was committed under section 4404 had been given
full judicial hearings, the courts would have been flooded with liti-
gation. Statistics show that 75% of the patients in our mental hospitals
had been committed pursuant to section 4404, or other similar in-
voluntary commitment statutes amended by the Act.40 Undoubtedly, this
number totaled in the tens of thousands. However, this problem was
eliminated when the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, Of-
fice of Mental Health, "voluntarily" recommitted 88% of the total
population who were originally committed under section 4404 and
other similar provisions of law in effect prior to the enactment of the
1966 Act.
A few questions are raised concerning this procedure. First, if one is
going to voluntarily commit 88% of the section 4404 committals, then
36. Id.
37. 208 Va. 243, 156 S.E.2d 874 (1967); accord, State v. Hance, 2 Md. App. 162, 233 A.2d
326 (1967); Sult v. Weber, 210 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1968); Brumley v. Charles R. Denny
Juvenile Center, 77 Wash. 2d 702, 466 P.2d 481 (1970), where the court said it felt for
the most part the vast majority of the juvenile hearings held were fair, and therefore
its decision was to prospectively apply Gault; contra, Application of Bille, 6 Ariz. App.
65, 429 P.2d 699 (1967); Marsden v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 352 Mass. 564,.227
N.E.2d 1 (1967).
38. 208 Va. 243, 248, 156 S.E.2d 874, 877 (1967).
39. 208 Va. 243, 156 S.E.2d 874 (1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 945 (1968).
40. Letter, supra note 12.
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why weren't these patients committed in this manner originally? The
reason for this may be that it was easier to obtain a section 4404 com-
mitment (since the patient's permission was not needed and probably
could not have been obtained). Why then was the state able to obtain
permission now? One reason is that once a person is placed in an
institution for any length of time, the coercive atmosphere makes the
patient "accept" his position. Consequently the choice of either leaving
the "safe" confines of the institution or staying in the institution is not
really a choice at all. Therefore one has to question the validity of
these "voluntary" recommitments.
If one considers both the burden on the administration of justice
in giving every patient a trial, and the past reliance on section 4404
(that is 75% of the patients being committed pursuant to that section),
one can see that two of the three propsectivity criteria have been met.
The third criterion is also complied with. The purpose in applying
the new Dixon standard retroactively would not be served, because
the court did not say the old procedure was fundamentally unfair in
impairing the truth-seeking function. As noted previously, its deter-
mination that the old statute was unconstitutional only said it was not
in line with today's idea that commitment to a mental institution is
in the nature of a criminal proceeding and therefore must have all of
its judicial safeguards. The old method was only a different way of
arriving at the insanity determination. Now that a new standard has
been set, it can be applied prospectively.
DISCHARGE THROUGH WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
If the decision had been applied prospectively, patients who were
committed under section 4404 could have obtained relief through
section 4426 of the Act dealing with the right to petition for a writ
of habeas corpus.41 Through this section those patients who had wished
41. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4426 (1969), Habeas Corpus; discharge by order of court;
(a) Every person committed or detained in a facility by reason of the provisions of
this act or any one acting on his behalf, may at any time, petition for a writ of
Habeas Corpus and, except as hereinafter provided, said petition shall be filed in
accordance with the provisions of the act of May 25, 1951.
(b) Said petition may be based upon the following grounds:
(1) The insufficiency or illegality of the proceedings leading to such person's commit-
ment, or,
(2) Although the commitment proceedings were proper, such person's continued
detention or hospitalization is not warranted by reason of mental disability. Where
the petition is based on this ground; (i) it shall be accompanied by the affidavit of a
physician stating that he has examined the person and is of the opinion that such
681
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to protest their confinement could have brought a new action under
section 4426(B)2 to decide the issue of insanity. The only requirement
is that in order to get to court the patient must have a physician certify
that he is sane.42
Where the petition is based on [proper proceedings], it shall be
accompanied by the affidavit of a physician stating that he has ex-
amined the person and is of the opinion that such a person is not
mentally disabled, or that such mental disability does not require
care or treatment in a facility .... 43 (Emphasis added).
In other words, in order for the patient to get a judicial determination
of sanity, he must be declared sane by at least one physician. In light
of the court decision in Dixon concerning certification by a physician
as procedure for commitment, it is suspected that this requirement of
a certification by a doctor that the patient is sane as a criterion for ob-
taining the writ of habeas corpus is at least arguably unconstitutional.
This section suffers from the same infirmity as section 4404. It provides
for a procedure which is devoid of due process of law-legal questions
are determined by doctors who are unaware of applicable legal issues.
Perhaps a better safeguard to protect the court from spurious claims
would be a panel of lawyers to hear the patient's complaint. These
lawyers would be familiar with commitment proceedings and their
legal issues. If the panel feels that the patient has raised a question of
sanity, then a full judicial hearing could be given. As seen in Dixon,
when legal issues are left to physicians due process protections are left
with them. Legal questions are for lawyers-not doctors.
If a patient wishes to challenge his commitment under 4404 he
should be allowed to do so, subject to review by a panel of lawyers.
As long as there is a question of sanity, it should be explored in a full
judicial hearing.
To have the patient make a meaningful choice, when he attacks his
commitment, more should be offered than just the choice of freedom.
If a patient, when deciding to attack his confinement, is faced with
stark freedom (meaning outright release) or the confines of the institu-
tion, he may choose the latter. But if he is given an alternative-a half-
person is not mentally disabled or that such metal disability does not require care
or treatment in a facility, and (ii) the burden of proof shall rest upon the director
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way house, he may be encouraged to attack his confinement and leave
the institution.
This halfway house would be in the nature of a hospital or a less
institutionalized home. There the patient could be given the opportu-
nity to experience a less rigid form of living. Then, if he is given the
choice to stay where he is at the institution, or to live in a halfway
house where he can be reoriented to normal living, he would choose
the latter. If this were done the patient could make a more meaningful
choice; possibly 88% of the section 4404 commitals might not have
"chosen" to remain in the institution.
Once the determination has been made that someone will have to
be committed through a civil court commitment procedure, what is
the standard for the burden of proof? Section 4406 of the Act requires
that in order to be committed a patient "must be in need of care or
treatment" by reason of "mental disability.' 44 Yet in the Dixon order
the court said:
The burden of proof shall be as follows: The evidence found to
be reliable by the fact-finder must establish clearly, unequivocally
and convincingly that the subject of the hearing requires commit-
ment because of manifest indications that the subject poses a
present threat of serious physical harm to other persons or to him-
self. (Emphasis added).45
The question remains which standard is applicable to the hearing.
Since the court addressed itself to section 4404, and not 4406, one
would say that they did not declare section 4406 unconstitutional. If
anything, it would be considered as a suggestion; that it is unconstitu-
tional and it could be followed or ignored when the constitutionality of
the section is determined at a later time.
Probably the court, not mindful of the adequate standards already
outlined in section 4406, was caught up in its zeal to uphold the highest
constitutional standard possible and, through the course of the order,
set a higher standard of proof. If the court addressed itself directly to
the constitutionality of section 4406, it is certain it would have been
approved.
Reviewing the fact that the old commitment procedure was not
fundamentally unfair; and the burden on the administration and re-
44. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4406 (1969).
45. 325 F. Supp. 966, 974 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
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liance on the old statute was great, Dixon should have been applied
prospectively. This does not mean all of the patients committed under
the old section should have been denied relief. Using this "reformed"
writ of habeas corpus a patient who has a legally sufficient question of
sanity can get full judicial determination of the issue.
When deciding to attack his commitment a patient should be of-
fered a choice of either going to a halfway house or remaining in the
institution. If he does choose to attack his commitment the new hear-
ing will be per Dixon, a full judicial hearing. In this hearing the
burden of proof will be the standard of proof as outlined under section
4406 of the Act.
Frank Leo Brunetti
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